We study the link between the cross-border funding activities of global banks and the international transmission of business cycles. First, using a dataset compiled by the Federal Reserve Board, we document three stylized facts about the operations of foreign banks in the United States: (i) The net borrowing of foreign branches from their parent banks is procyclical with the U.S. economy. (ii)
Introduction
Starting in the summer of 2007, the Federal Reserve and other central banks implemented nontraditional policies to mitigate the e¤ect of disruptions in their local credit and derivatives markets.
For example, one trigger of the crisis was the run on the liabilities of special purpose vehicles (nonbank …nancial entities) that …nanced their holdings of long term assets with commercial paper (Arteta et al., 2009 ). Most of the riskier special purpose vehicles were sponsored by large European banks, which provided them with backup liquidity facilities. As these entities became unable to roll over their outstanding commercial paper (largely denominated in U.S. dollars) in August 2007, they tapped into the backup lines of credit provided by their European sponsors. In turn, the sponsoring banks had to seek additional funding in the interbank and other money markets. European banks with a presence in the United States (that is, branches or subsidiaries) sought to borrow in the U.S. money markets to …nance their dollar denominated assets, disrupting these markets. In response, by the end of 2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) to complement its traditional discount window operations, and had arranged liquidity swap lines with other major central banks, as the U.S. interbank market was still under stress.
These events motivate our focus on the role a group of …nancial institutions that have large and increasing linkages to U.S credit markets: foreign-owned banks operating in the United States. Our study is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, we document the cyclical ‡uctuations of intrabank transactions between foreign banks and their U.S.-based branches, as well as their lending behavior in the United States, using a dataset compiled by the Federal Reserve Board from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) reports. 1 First, we document that the "net due to" position of the U.S.-based branches of European banks -a measure of the net outstanding loans issued by foreign banks to their branches in the United States -is positively correlated with the GDP growth di¤erential between the United States and the European Union-16 (see Figure 1 ). Second, we 1 These reporting forms are used to collect information on the balance sheet position of the U.S.-based branches of foreign banks (FFIEC 002) every quarter, for the interval between1980:Q1 and 2009:Q4. In particular, the reports provide information on the assets and liabilities of these branches with respect to their related o¢ ces, including the head o¢ ce. In addition, we use data on the lending by U.S.-based commercial banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) to small and large U.S. …rms, reported in the FFIEC 031 report.
report that lending of foreign branches in the United States is procyclical with respect to U.S. GDP growth, and more volatile than the total lending of domestic banks (see Figure 2 ). Third, we present evidence of the procyclicality, with respect to U.S. GDP growth, of the share of loans granted by foreign subsidiaries to small U.S. …rms in the total number ( Figure 3 ) and the total value ( Figure 4) ; the share of foreign banks'lending to small U.S. …rms is also more volatile than the share of lending by domestic banks to small U.S. …rms, indicating the presence of an extensive margin in the lending of foreign banks to U.S. …rms. For example, in Figure 3 , the share of small U.S. …rms (proxyed by loans less than $100,000) in the total number of outstanding loans issued by foreign subsidiaries fell during the U.S. recession in 2001, increased during the subsequent recovery, and declined again as the U.S. economy slowed in the late 2000s; it was more volatile than the share of loans to small U.S. …rms provided by domestic banks. Figure 4 shows a similar pattern, albeit less pronounced, for the share of small U.S. …rms in the total value of outstanding loans provided by foreign subsidiaries. 2 In the theoretical section, we examine the relationship between the cross-border funding activities of global banks, their ability to use foreign deposits to issue local loans, and the international transmission of business cycles. In order to explain the three stylized facts presented above and study their macroeconomic implications, we propose a two-country, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with international banks. In each economy, there is one representative household and a continuum of monopolistically-competitive …rms that are heterogeneous in labor productivity. Every period, …rms borrow working capital from banks. There are two types of banks in each countrylocal and global -that attract deposits from the local household and give loans to the local …rms. In addition to its domestic operations, the global bank collects foreign deposits through its foreign branch and issues loans to foreign …rms, maintaining the ability to fund domestic loans with foreign deposits.
The global bank is relatively more productive than the local bank in its ability to transform deposits into loans, and therefore issues loans at a lower interest rate. Thus, each …rm can either borrow locally 2 In level terms, the foreign subsidiaries tend to lend less to the small U.S. …rms than it is the case for U.S. banks. Thus, Figure 3 shows that small U.S. …rms receive about 75 percent of the number of outstanding loans issued by U.S. banks, but only 60 percent of the number of loans issued by foreign subsidiaries. Figure 4 also shows that the loans to small U.S. …rms represent a larger share of the value of outstanding loans of U.S. banks than foreign subsidiaries (i.e. 20 vs. 10 percent respectively). from the local bank or take a syndicated loan provided by the two global banks. Borrowing from the global banks has the advantages of a lower interest rate and access to international funding during expansions, but requires …rms to pay a per-period …xed cost.
We aim to explore the dynamics generated by our model for the cross-border lending operations of international banks, as well as their e¤ect on the volatility of the business cycle and welfare in the two economies 3 We focus on two types of shocks: (i) aggregate productivity shocks that a¤ect the …rms'demand for bank loans; and (ii) regulatory provisions a¤ecting the foreign banks'ability to use foreign funds for domestic loans. First, following an aggregate productivity increase in Home, foreign banks …nd it increasingly pro…table to convert foreign deposits into loans for the home …rms. In turn, this should generate a procyclical "net due to" position of the foreign branch in Home relative to its parent bank, increased foreign lending in the United States, and increased access to foreign funds for the smaller U.S. …rms, as in the data. Second, regulatory provisions that reduce the ability of the global banks to transform foreign deposits into local loans should dampen the response of domestic real activity to shocks, thus lowering the volatility of output.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed liquidity regulation designed to incentivize banks to manage liquidity risk more prudently (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). As mentioned above, the frameworks developed in our DSGE model allows us to examine, to some extent, the e¤ect of this regulation on cross-border intrabank lending. For example, branches of foreign banks in the United States moslty fund their balance sheets using wholesale and shortterm …nancing. Thus, we analyze the e¤ect of these regulatory restrictions, a¤ecting global liquidity management, on several economic indicators in both the home and foreign countries.
Why do we focus our study on foreign banks? At the end of September 2008, the month when Lehman Brothers collapsed, the U.S.-based branches of foreign banks held $2.1 trillion in assets, equivalent to almost one-…fth of the assets held by all insured commercial banks in the United States.
These institutions obtain their funding in the wholesale deposit market and in the interbank market, 
Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence of the activities of international banks in the United States.
We focus on U.S.-based branches of foreign banks, in particular on branches with parent banks headquartered in Europe.
Over the last three decades, U.S. branches of foreign banks have been increasingly active in the U.S. wholesale credit and money markets. Low costs of entering the U.S. market through branches, as opposed to subsidiaries, makes it attractive to foreign banks that want to access U.S. capital markets without a need of tapping retail customers. During the recent …nancial crisis, these branches played an important role while serving as conduits for foreign banks to the U.S. money markets.
In the rest of this section, we describe a dataset containing information on the activities of U.S. branches of foreign banks. The stylized facts derived from these data guided us in the development of our theoretical model, which explicitly addresses the question of linkages between two economies through the banking sector, particularly through intrabank lending. We test for factors that determine the …nancial linkages of these branches vis-a-vis their parents through time. Finally, we describe other stylized facts that are incorporated in the model.
Data
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) requires all U.S. branches of foreign banks to report balance sheet and o¤-balance sheet information every quarter in the "Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks" (FFIEC 002). Table 1 To analyze the transmission of shocks between countries, we focus on intrabank transactions.
Financial ‡ows between branches and parent banks can take the form of loans or repatriation of pro…ts. In Table 1 
Determinants of Intrabank Transactions
Above, we provided some evidence on the ‡uctuations of intrabank transactions through time. In this section, we formally test for the determinants of these ‡ows of resources between parent banks and their branches. In Table 2 we estimate the following equation:
Where NDT is the Net Due To (or Gross Due To or Gross Due From) position of foreign branches in the United States and TA is total assets; branches are indexed by i , countries by j and time by t; USGDP and ForeignGDP are the growth rates of U.S. GDP and the branch home country's GDP, respectively; USFedFundsRate is the e¤ective real federal funds rate; LogAssets is the log value of claims on non-related parties, a measure of the branch's size; and ij is a branch speci…c …xed e¤ect.
We show the results of this estimation in Table 2 . The main …nding is that the Net Due To position of foreign branches are positively related to U.S. GDP growth. Branches lend less to their parents when the U.S. economy is growing faster, as shown by the negative coe¢ cient on U.S. GDP growth in column (3). Tighter monetary policy decreases both the Gross Due To position and the Gross Due
From position having no e¤ect on the net position.
In Table 3 we estimate the same equation, but break down the sample between large and small branches. We …nd that intrabank transactions for large branches not only depend on U.S. GDP growth by also on U.S. monetary policy. An increase in the real e¤ective federal funds rate decrease the amount the branches lend to their parents. As liquidity is tighter in the United States, parents decrease the amount of funds that they demand from U.S. investors through their branches.
Lastly, Table 4 provides some evidence on the role that branches played during the recent …nan- global banks, whereas the less productive …rms borrow locally.
Households
In what follows we describe the model from the perspective of the home economy. Since the model is symmetric, the setup for the foreign economy is similar. Variables from the foreign economy are denoted with a star superscript.
The representative household in Home maximizes the expected lifetime utility subject to its budget constraint: max
; where 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, C t is aggregate consumption, and > 0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The budget constraint is:
The representative household starts every period with share holdings x t in a mutual fund of N t …rms whose average market value is e v t , and also with deposits D t allocated across the home local bank, the home global bank and the foreign branch operating in Home. It receives dividends equal to the average …rm pro…t e t in proportion with the number of operating …rms N t and its share holdings x t . It also receives interest r t D t on bank deposits, and the real wage w t for the amount of labor L 1 supplied inelastically.
Every period, the household purchases x t+1 shares in a mutual fund of …rms that includes: (i) N t …rms that already produce at time t, and (ii) N E;t new …rms that enter the market in period t. Each share is worth its market value e v t , equal to the net present value of the expected stream of future pro…ts for the average …rm. The household also places new bank deposits D t+1 subject to a quadratic adjustment cost 2 D t+1 2 . Finally, the household purchases the consumption basket C t .
The …rst order conditions with respect to consumption C t and new deposits D t+1 imply:
The …rst order condition for stock holdings x t+1 implies:
which takes into account the mechanism of endogenous …rm entry (described in the next section), with the law of motion for the number of …rms N t+1 = (1 )(N t + N Et ) and the rate of …rm exit .
Firms 3.2.1 Firm entry and exit
New …rms enter the market every period, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) . In the home market, …rm entry requires a sunk entry cost equal to f E units of the home e¤ective labor. 5 After paying the sunk entry cost, each …rm is randomly assigned an idiosyncratic labor productivity factor z which is drawn independently from a common distribution G(z) with support over the interval [z min ; 1), and which is …xed over time.
The N E;t …rms entering at time t do not produce until period t + 1. All …rms, including the new entrants, are subject to a random exit shock that occurs with probability at the end of every period.
Thus, the law of motion for the number of producing …rms is:
The potential entrant …rms anticipate their expected post-entry value e v t , which depends on the expected stream of future pro…ts e t , the stochastic discount factor, and the exogenous probability of exit every period. The forward iteration of the Euler equation for stocks (3) generates an expression for the expected post-entry value of the average …rm, e
s t Cs Ct f s : Thus, every period, the unbounded pool of potential entrant …rms faces a trade-o¤ between the sunk entry cost and the expected stream of future monopolistic pro…ts. In equilibrium, …rm entry takes place until the expected value of the average …rm is equal to the sunk entry cost expressed in units of the 5 The sunk entry cost is equivalent to fEwt=Zt units of the home consumption basket.
home consumption basket:
Country-speci…c goods
Each …rm produces a di¤erent variety of goods, y t (!). All varieties ! available at period t (i.e. set )
are included a country-speci…c good:
where > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across varieties. The home-speci…c good b
competition, the price of the home-speci…c good depends on the prices of each variety p t (!), so that
We de…ne the home consumption basket C t as an aggregate of the home and foreign-speci…c goods:
where y > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across the home and foreign-speci…c goods, and ! is the degree of home bias. We set C t as the numeraire good, so that its price is normalized to unit:
Under monopolistic competition, the demand for the home and foreign-speci…c goods is Y h;t = y (p h;t ) y C t and Y f;t = (1 y ) (p f;t Q t ) y C t ; respectively, where
Pt is the real exchange rate.
Working capital: local vs. global borrowing
The …rm with idiosyncratic labor productivity z obtains output y t (z) = Z t zn t (z); which is a function of the aggregate productivity Z t , the …rm-speci…c labor productivity z, and domestic labor n t (z). 6 Moreover, each …rm must borrow working capital in order to pay a fraction of its labor costs at the beginning of each period, before it produces and sells its output. To this end, …rms must choose one of two possible borrowing strategies: (1) Borrow from the local bank for a relatively higher interest rate.
(2) Use a syndicated loan from the home global bank and the local branch of the foreign global bank.
Working with the global banks has the advantage of a lower interest rate, but requires a per-period …xed cost.
Below we describe the mechanisms of borrowing from either the local or the global banks as alternative choices for each …rm.
Local loans The …rm that chooses to borrow from the local bank maximizes its per-period pro…t:
borrowing cost subject to the demand for variety y t (z); and the requirement that …rms must borrow working capital l t (z) in order to pay a fraction of its labor cost w t n t (z) at the beginning of each period:
Substituting the constraints into the pro…t function, the pro…t-maximization problem implies the 6 Since each …rm produces a di¤erent variety, the …rm-speci…c productivity z also serves as an index for varieties. Given that one unit of labor produces Ztz, and given that wt is the real wage, the unit cost of production is w t Z t z : equilibrium price and pro…t:
Global loans The …rm that borrows from the global banks obtains a lower interest rate r G;t < r L;t , as described in the next section on banks, but faces a …xed cost f G wt Zt every period. It maximizes the per-period pro…t:
The maximization problem implies the following price and pro…t:
Endogenous productivity cuto¤
When deciding upon the location of production every period, the …rm with productivity z compares the pro…t obtained if it borrows locally, L;t (z), with the pro…t obtained if it borrows from the global banks, G;t (z). Each …rm chooses the borrowing strategy that maximizes its per-period pro…t. As a particular case, we de…ne the productivity cuto¤ z G;t on the support interval [z min ; 1), so that the …rm at the cuto¤ is indi¤erent across borrowing from the local or the global banks:
The model implies that only the relatively more productive …rms …nd it pro…table to work with the global banks. Despite the lower interest rate associated with borrowing from the global banks, only …rms with idiosyncratic productivity above a certain cuto¤ (z > z G;t ) obtain pro…ts that are large enough to cover the …xed cost f G wt Zt .
In order to illustrate the endogenous determination of the productivity cuto¤ z G;t , we re-write the per-period pro…ts from local and global borrowing as functions of z 1 :
In Figure 5 , we plot the two pro…ts as functions of the idiosyncratic productivity parameter z 1 over the support interval [z min ; 1). The vertical intercept for local borrowing is zero; the intercept is equal to the negative of the …xed cost required to borrow from the global banks ( f G w t Qt Z t ). The existence of the equilibrium productivity cuto¤ z G;t requires that the pro…t function associated with borrowing from the global banks must be steeper than the pro…t from working with the local bank, i.e. slope f G;t (z)g > slope f L;t (z)g : When this condition is met, borrowing from the global banks generates greater pro…ts for the …rms with idiosyncratic productivity z along the upper range of the support interval (z > z G;t ). The higher productivity of the global banks allows them to lend for a lower interest rate than the local bank, r G;t < r L;t . This property ensures that the slope inequality is satis…ed.
Aggregation over heterogeneous …rms
We de…ne two average labor productivity levels for …rms that borrow locally (e z L;t ) and globally (e z G;t ), illustrated in Figure 5 , and solve the model in terms of two representative …rms. Every period t, e z L;t is the average productivity of the N L;t …rms that borrow locally (z < z C;t ), and e z G;t is the average productivity of the N G;t …rms that borrow from the global banks (z > z C;t ).
Assuming that the …rm-speci…c labor productivity z is Pareto-distributed, with p.d.f. g(z) = kz min =z k+1 and c.d.f. G(z) = 1 (z min =z) k ; we obtain the following expressions for the …rm produc-tivity averages (see the Appendix):
Using the …rm productivity averages, we write the average prices of varieties produced by the local and global-borrowing …rms as:
e p G;t = 1
The corresponding average pro…ts are:
The price indexes for the home and foreign-speci…c goods become:
The expressions for total pro…ts in Home and Foreign are:
N t e t = N L;t e L;t + N G;t e G;t (17)
Banks
There are two types of banks in each economy, a local and a global bank. Banks are competitive and earn zero pro…ts. In Home, the local bank and the global bank attract deposits from the local households and issue loans to the local …rms. In addition to its domestic operations, the home global bank collects wholesale deposits from the foreign inter-bank market and issues loans to foreign …rms.
Let c j 1, with j 2 fL; Gg, be the cost parameter for the local and the global banks, respectively, that characterizes the technology used by each bank to transform deposits (
Following de Blas and Russ (2010) , the cost parameter represents non-interest expenditures or institutional ine¢ ciencies that prevent the bank from transforming a certain portion of deposits into loans. The portion of deposits not used to make loans increases with the cost parameter c j . More, the cost introduces a wedge between the interest rate that banks pay on deposits and the rate they charge for loans, which increases with the cost parameter. Therefore, the assumption that global banks are more productive than the local banks, c G < c L , implies that the global bank can issue loans at a lower rate than the local bank.
The local bank
The local bank obtains zero pro…ts under perfect competition:
where r L;t is the interest rate on loans, and
c L is the amount of loans issued based on deposits
Given the mechanism of endogenous …rm entry/exogenous exit, a fraction of all …rms exit every period without producing any output. We assume that …rms receiving the exit shock default on their bank loans, as in Russ and Valderrama (2010) : In the event of default, banks must audit the exiting …rms in order to liquidate the remaining assets at the cost . Banks recover the borrowed funds, but with no interest and minus the monitoring cost. Therefore, r L;t (1 )L L t is the total interest income received by the bank for good loans, and L L t is the monitoring cost paid for non-performing loans.
Finally, r t D L t represents the interest paid on deposits.
The global bank
The pro…t of the home global bank is similar to that of the local bank, except for that the global bank borrows and lends in both Home and Foreign:
The home global bank charges interest rate r G;t for loans granted to the home …rms (L H;t ) and to the foreign …rms (L H;t ). Since the loans issued to foreign …rms are expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket (L H;t ), we convert them into home units using the real exchange rate Q t . The bank must pay the monitoring cost associated with non-performing loans issued in Home and for non-performing loans issued in Foreign. Finally, the global bank obtains deposits D H;t from home, for which it pays the interest rate r t . It also receives wholesale deposits D H;t Q t from the foreign inter-bank market, for which it pays the interest rate r t .
The total amount of loans issued by the global bank is constrained by the bank's ability to transform total deposits into total loans,
; where c G 1;where D H;t and D H;t Q t are the deposits received at home and abroad, respectively. Under symmetry = and = ; the interest charged by the global bank is a weighted average of the costof home and foreign deposits:
Market clearing for loans
The market clearing condition for loans issued by the local bank is:
where N L;t is the number of …rms that borrow locally, and e z L;t and e p L;t are the average productivity and price of local borrowers.
The more productive home …rms obtain a syndicated loan issued by the home global bank (L H;t ) and the foreign global bank (L F;t ), with elasticity of substitution > 1 and home bias 0 < < 1:
where N G t is the number of home …rms that borrow from global banks, and e z G;t and e p G;t are their average productivity and price. The interest rate for the syndicated loan is:
Finally, the demand for loans provided by the home and foreign global banks are: 7
7 Similarly, the credit market clearing condition for loans issued by the foreign local banks is:
For the loans issued to foreign …rms working with global …nancial intermediaries, the market clearing condition is:
The demand functions for each type of loans included in the aggregate are L F;t = r G;t r S;t N G;t e l G;t for the foreign bank loans and L H;t = (1 )( r G;t r S;t N G;t e l G;t for the home bank loans, expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket.
The allocation of deposits
We assume that the …nancial intermediaries in Home (i.e. the home local bank, the home global bank, and the local branch of the foreign global bank) obtain …xed fractions of the total deposits D t made by the representative household, which we de…ne as S L ; S H and S F ; respectively, so that
For instance, the home local and global banks receive deposits S L D t and S H D t in the home retail market every period. The local branch of the foreign global bank receives deposits S F D t in the home wholesale market every period. 8
Loan constraints for banks
The total amount of loans issued by the home global bank (domestically and abroad), expressed in units of the home consumption basket, is constrained by the total amount of deposits it receives:
Similarly, the loan constraint of the foreign global bank, in units of the foreign consumption basket, is:
Net due to position of bank branches
Global banks receive …xed shares of the local deposits, but place variable shares of their loans across countries, according to the relative demand for loans. For example, the foreign branch in Home can issue more local loans than it receives deposits if it borrows from abroad. We de…ne the net due position expressed in units of the foreign consumption basket as the di¤erence between the total loans issued in Home and the amount of such loans covered by local deposits:
Similarly, the net due position of the home branch in Foreign is:
Balance of Payments
The balance of payments condition implies that the trade balance equals the negative of the …nancial account balance:
Results: impulse response analysis
The transmission of shocks across countries is traced via an impulse response analysis. The table in illustrates the e¤ects of a domestic productivity shock for the home country and the implications for the dynamics of the cross-border intrabank capital ‡ows. After a positive technology shock at home (the US), labor supply increases, as the marginal product of labor is higher, prompting higher output and consumption. The higher productivity prompts …rm entry, so the total number of …rms increases.
Moreover, the productivity cuto¤ for participating in the international loans market is reduced, which is re ‡ected in a larger share of …rms borrowing from the global banks. Thus, although the positive shock also induces higher deposit savings by households, the increase in the demand for resources from higher …rm entry makes interest rates go up in the economy. The interest rate o¤ered by local banks increases by more than that of global banks, since the latter have the additional funding from the foreign economy. The latter is re ‡ected in the decline in the net due to position of foreign branches in the US, which means that such branches are increasing their borrowing from their parents abroad in order to satisfy the higher demand in the US.
Regulatory changes that restrict these intrabank ‡ows will likely dampen the e¤ects of productivity shocks in the home country. Thus, output changes may become less volatile.
Conclusions and Further Extensions
The paper studies the dynamics of output, interest rates and cross border intrabank lending in the presence of country-speci…c shocks. In particular, in response to a positive productivity shock in one economy, the …rms'ability to access foreign funding through the global banks signi…cantly ampli…es the economic boom. The ampli…cation e¤ect is enhanced as a larger fraction of small …rms in the domestic economy …nd it optimal to tap international loans. In contrast, following an adverse local productivity shock, the decline in international bank lending exacerbates the domestic contraction.
In this framework, we also aim to examine the economic e¤ects of proposed Basel III liquidity standards-that would dampen the amount of cross-border intrabank lending by limiting banks'ability to use short-term funding for cross-country loans.
A.3 Indi¤erence condition for the marginal …rm
The …rm with productivity equal to the cuto¤ z G;t is indi¤erent between borrowing from local or global banks. Using the pro…t indi¤erence condition L;t (z G;t ) = G;t (z G;t ) and equations (25) and (26), we write the link between the average pro…ts of the local and global borrowers. Starting with (26),
A.4 Impulse response to positive productivity shock to the domestic economy 1984q1  1985q1  1986q1  1987q1  1988q1  1989q1  1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1  1998q1  1999q1  2000q1  2001q1  2002q1  2003q1  2004q1  2005q1  2006q1  2007q1 Note: The number of small business loans (i.e. less than US$ 100,000) is expressed as a fraction of the total number of outstanding loans for each bank, measured at the end of the second quarter of each year; we average the resulting shares over domestic vs. foreign banks. Note: The number of small business loans (i.e. less than US$ 100,000) is expressed as a fraction of the total number of outstanding loans for each bank, measured at the end of the second quarter of each year; we average the resulting shares over domestic vs. foreign banks. 
